



# Systems & Software

## Security

COMSM0050

2020/2021

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


# Intel SGX

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# Rootkit high-level understanding



# Motivation

- An attacker can compromise
  - User space
  - Operating Systems
  - Even the hardware!
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- What can we do?

Execute code in its own secure enclave!

# SGX Hardware supported enclave


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# SGX Hardware supported enclave

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- **Idea:** run an application within some isolation unit so it cannot be affected by the OS
  - don't trust the OS or the VMM/hypervisor
  - only need to trust the hardware

# SGX Hardware supported enclave


- **WARNING:** there is vulnerability in SGX
- **Idea:** run an application within some isolation unit so it cannot be affected by the OS
  - don't trust the OS or the VMM/hypervisor
  - only need to trust the hardware
  - reduce attack surface






# SGX preventing memory snooping attack

- Security boundary is CPU package
- Data unencrypted inside the CPU
- Data outside the CPU is encrypted
- External memory reads and bus snooping only see encrypted data




# SGX Programming environment




User Process

# SGX Programming environment



User Process


# SGX Programming environment



User Process

- Enclave has its own code and data
  - Provide confidentiality
  - Provide integrity
- Controlled entry point
  - Can enter enclave code only at specific point
  - Enclave execution takes over

# Memory protection



# SGX Application Flow

1. Define and partition application into trusted and untrusted part
2. App create enclave
3. Trusted function is called
4. Code in enclave process some secret
5. Trusted function returns
6. App continue as normal

